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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the Industrial Commission Board of Review ("Board") 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Board's decision to deny unemployment 
benefits to an employee who was discharged after testing positive 
for marijuana on two separate occasions in violation of the 
employer's written policy was supported by sufficient evidence. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Employment Security Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 
35-4-5(b)(l). 
Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
* * * 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act or 
omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's 
rightful interest, if so found by the commission, 
and thereafter until the claimant has earned an 
amount equal to at least six times the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered 
employment. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Respondent Morton Thiokol, Inc. ("Respondent") incorpor-
ates by reference the statement of the Nature of the Case set 
forth at pages 3 and 4 of the Amicus Curiae Brief of the American 
Civil Liberties Union except as specifically stated below. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Respondent, Morton Thiokol, Inc., is a private employer 
with numerous contracts with the Federal Government and Agencies 
of the Federal Government. Respondent is also widely known as a 
contractor of rocket boosters for the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration's ("NASA") space shuttle program.1 
Appellant, Kevin R. Johnson, was employed by Respondent as a 
welder for two-and-one-half years until he was discharged for 
cause on December 11, 1987. (Claimant's Statement of Reason for 
Discharge, Record at p. 2.) 
Appellant was discharged from his employment after 
testing positive for marijuana on two separate occasions. 
(Administrative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988, Record at 
xThese facts are not set forth in the record. However, 
Respondent asks this Court to take judicial notice of these facts 
pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence on the ground 
that these matters are of common and general knowledge within the 
Court's jurisdiction. See, DeFusion Company v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, 613 P.2d 1120, 1124 (Utah 1980); Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah App. 
1988). 
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p. 14.) Appellant was tested for drugs pursuant to a written drug 
testing policy established by Respondent in July of 1985. (Adminis-
trative Law Judge Hearing February 11, 1988, Record at p. 15.) 
Appellant does not dispute he knew of Respondent's drug testing 
policy prior to the first test and that he tested positive for an 
illegal drug, marijuana, on both occasions. (Stipulated to by 
counsel for Appellant; Administrative Law Judge Hearing October 
26, 1988, Record at p. 64.) (Administrative Law Judge Hearing 
February 11, 1988, Record at p. 20.) It is also undisputed that 
Respondent's drug testing program and testing of Appellant complied 
with the requirements of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, 
U.C.A. § 34-38-1 et seg. (attached hereto as Addendum 1). 
Appellant admitted to using marijuana prior to the first 
time he tested positive. (Administrative Law Judge Hearing 
October 26, 1988, Record at p. 64.) Although Appellant denied 
using marijuana between the time of the first test (September 21, 
1987) and the time of the second test (November 25, 1987), the 
Board found the Appellant's testimony not credible based on the 
testimony of Dr. Kerr, Respondent's Medical Director. Dr. Kerr 
testified that the testing procedures adopted and followed by 
Respondent were designed to account for the possibility of passive 
inhalation as well as gradual dissipation of an illegal 
substance. (Board of Review Decision, Record at p. 88.) Dr. Kerr 
testified that Respondent's drug testing program includes 
follow-up testing for marijuana six weeks after the initial 
-3-
positive test, and that the procedure complied with the 
recommendation of the Center for Human Toxicology at the University 
of Utah. (Administrative Law Judge Hearing October 26, 1988, 
Record at p. 83.) Dr. Kerr also testified that only actual use of 
marijuana could account for the Appellant testing positive on the 
second test, and that a test could only be positive for a brief 
period if it results from extreme exposure2 to passive 
inhalation. (Administrative Law Judge Hearing October 26, 1988, 
Record at p. 80-81.) Dr. Kerr's testimony was unrebutted.3 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court must affirm the Board's decision denying 
Appellant unemployment benefits on the ground that he was 
2Extreme exposure was defined as three or four hours of 
confinement in a small room or car with three to six people heavily 
smoking marijuana. 
3Evidence was also solicited from Dr. Ellwood L. Loveridge. 
Appellant, however, objected to this testimony and the objection 
was sustained by the Board of Review. (Administrative Law Judge 
Hearing October 26, 1988, Record at pp. 72-73; Board of Review 
Decision, Record at p. 87.) The testimony of Dr. Loveridge, even 
if considered, is not relevant because Dr. Loveridge is not an 
expert in marijuana testing or research, his offered testimony is 
based solely on the verbal comments of ten individuals and not on 
any scientific study, and he has no direct knowledge of the testing 
of the ten individuals. Appellant and the American Civil Liberties 
Union ("ACLU") have both attempted in this appeal to introduce 
evidence from the National Law Journal that is not in the record 
below. Respondent objects to this Court's consideration of the 
evidence provided by Dr. Loveridge and the "facts" not found in the 
record set forth in Appellant's Brief at pp. 13, 14 and 15 and in 
the ACLU's Brief at p. 25. 
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was necessary in order for Respondent to avoid actual or potential 
harm. 
The other two elements determinative of "just cause" are 
also clearly established by the evidence- First, if Appellant did 
in fact smoke marijuana after the first test, he had the power to 
control his conduct and prevent the second positive test. Even if 
Appellant's testimony concerning passive inhalation is accepted as 
true (which the Board did not accept), Appellant had many 
alternatives available to him and within his power and control to 
accept in order to avoid being exposed to the marijuana smoking of 
his roommates. He thus had ability to prevent a second positive 
test. Finally, Appellant admitted that he knew he could be 
discharged for testing positive for drugs. 
The Board's decision must be affirmed because the 
evidence presented meets or exceeds the criteria for "just cause" 
necessary to deny unemployment benefits. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE BOARD'S DECISION DENYING APPELLANT UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court must affirm the Board's decision unless it 
determines "it was wrong because only the opposite conclusion 
could be drawn from the facts." Champlin Petroleum v. Department 
of Employment Security, 744 P.2d 330, 331 (Utah App. 1987). This 
Court is bound by the factual findings of the Board "[s]o long as 
there is evidence of any substance whatever to support the factual 
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1. Appellant's Conduct Evidences Culpability. 
The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for 
determining "just cause" provides the following explanation of 
"culpability." 
Culpability. This is the seriousness of the 
conduct as it affects continuance of the employ-
ment relationship. The discharge must have been 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
the employer's rightful interests. A discharge 
would not be considered "necessary" if it is not 
consistent with reasonable employment practices. 
The wrongness of the conduct must be considered 
in the context of the particular employment and 
how it affects the employer's rights. If the 
conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment 
and there is no expectation that the conduct will 
be continued or repeated, potential harm may not 
be shown and therefore it is not necessary to 
discharge the employee. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para Bl (1986). 
All employers and employees, including Respondent and 
Respondent's employees, are entitled to a drug-free workplace not 
only because of the significant safety hazard that drug use 
creates, but also because of the tremendous loss of human and 
monetary resources that results from drugs. Respondent recognized 
these concerns and acted to protect itself, its employees, and the 
general public by implementing a written drug and alcohol testing 
program in July of 1985. 
The Utah Legislature, because of similar concerns, made 
formal findings and enacted the Drug and Alcohol Testing Act. 
That Act states: 
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The Legislature finds that a healthy and 
productive work force, safe working conditions 
free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, and 
maintenance of the quality of products produced 
and services rendered in this state, are 
important to employers, employees and the general 
public. The Legislature further finds that the 
abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety of 
workplace problems, including increased injuries 
on the job, increased absenteeism, increased 
financial burden on health and benefit programs, 
increased workplace theft, decreased employee 
morale, decreased productivity, and decline in 
the quality of products and services. 
U.C.A. § 34-38-1. Respondent instituted its drug and alcohol 
testing program to protect legitimate interests and to avoid the 
actual and potential harms resulting from the use of illegal drugs 
as identified by the Legislature. 
Respondent not only has the concerns reflected by the 
Legislature's findings, but as a government contractor of highly 
sophisticated national defense products, it must comply with 
special regulations promulgated by the United States Department of 
Defense governing federal contractors concerning drugs in the 
workplace. On September 28, 1988, the Department of Defense 
issued an Interim Rule addressing drugs in the workplace. 53 Fed. 
Reg. 37,763, attached hereto as Addendum 2.5 The Interim Rule 
articulates the Defense Department policy that defense contractors 
50n October 21, 1988 Congress passed the Drug-Free Workplace 
Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690. This Act was signed into law by 
President Reagan on November 18, 1988, and became effective on 
March 18, 1989. 
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shall maintain a program for achieving a drug-free workplace, and 
adopts the following findings: 
(a) The use of illegal drugs, on or off 
duty, is inconsistent with law-abiding behavior 
expected of all citizens. Employees who use 
illegal drugs, on or off duty, tend to be less 
productive, less reliable, and prone to greater 
absenteeism resulting in the potential for 
increased cost, delay, and risk to the government 
contract. 
(b) The use of illegal drugs, on or off 
duty, by employees can impair the ability of 
those employees to perform tasks that are 
critical to proper contract performance and can 
also result in the potential for accidents on 
duty and for failures that can pose a serious 
threat to national security, health, and safety. 
(c) The use of illegal drugs, on or off 
duty, by employees in certain positions can 
result in less than the complete reliability, 
stability, and good judgment that are consistent 
with access to sensitive information. Use of 
illegal drugs also creates the possibility of 
coercion, influence, and irresponsible action 
under pressure that may pose a serious risk to 
national security, and health and safety. 
Based on these findings, the Department of Defense 
mandates that in certain contracts with the Department of Defense, 
including contracts with Respondent, the contractor shall 
institute and maintain a program for achieving a drug-free work 
Respondent, as an employer and in particular a government 
contractor, has a rightful and reasonable interest in a drug-free 
environment and it must implement a written drug and alcohol 
testing program to promote such an environment. Appellant 
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contends that culpability may be found only if there is actual job 
impairment; this position, however, contradicts the clear language 
of Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act and 
the Industrial Commission's administrative rules as well as prior 
case law. The Court need only find that the discharge is 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm and is consistent with 
reasonable business practice. Respondent's written drug testing 
policy together with the strong policy statements and requirements 
of the Utah Legislature and the United States Department of 
Defense evidence Respondent's reasonable right to maintain and 
expect a work environment that is free from the innumerable 
problems (actual or potential) created by the use of drugs and 
alcohol. Thus, this Court must find that the Board's decision 
with regard to the element of "culpability" is supported by the 
facts. 
2. Appellant's Conduct Was Within His Power and Capacity 
to Control or Prevent. 
The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for 
determining "just cause" contains the following explanation of 
"control". 
Control. The conduct must have been within 
the power and capacity of the claimant to control 
or prevent. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para Bl (1986). 
The Board chose to disregard Appellant's stated denial of 
marijuana use after the first test, and instead, relied upon the 
testimony of Dr. Kerr. He testified that Respondent's testing 
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program incorporated procedures to eliminate both passive 
inhalation and gradual dissipation of marijuana as causes for 
Appellant's second positive test. (Board of Review Decision, 
Record at p. 87) The law is well settled that conflicting 
evidence does not compel the conclusion that the Board's decision 
is not supported by any evidence. See Young v. Board of Review, 
731 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1986); Terminal Service Co. v. Board of 
Review, 714 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, sufficient evidence supports the Board's 
decision. First, the Appellant admitted prior use of marijuana. 
Second, the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Kerr established that 
Respondent's testing program allowed for follow-up testing six 
weeks after a positive test. The testing program resulted from 
Dr. Kerr's consultation with the Center for Human Toxicology at 
the University of Utah. Third, Dr. Kerr's unrebutted testimony 
established that only extreme exposure to passive inhalation, such 
as confinement in a car or small room for three or four hours with 
three to six people heavily smoking marijuana, could result in a 
positive test from passive inhalation. 
Dr. Kerr further testified that for a positive test to result from 
passive inhalation, a test must be administered shortly after the 
extreme exposure. Since the Board decided to disregard the 
Appellant's testimony denying his marijuana use after the first 
positive test, this Court must accept that finding, and conclude 
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that there was substantial evidence that the Appellant had the 
ability to control his conduct. 
Even if the Board believed Appellant's testimony 
concerning passive inhalation, the evidence establishes that 
Appellant retained the capacity to prevent passive inhalation. 
Appellant claimed his roommates were constantly smoking marijuana 
in his apartment. Notwithstanding Appellant's conduct in allowing 
his roommates to criminally use and possess marijuana, as the 
Board alluded to in its Decision at pages 89-90,6 Appellant 
failed to either curtail further use by his roommates in the 
apartment or to completely remove himself from the apartment. 
Numerous alternative avenues within his power and control were 
available to prevent passive inhalation. First, Appellant could 
have reported the conduct of his roommates to the landlord and 
sought his assistance in curbing their illegal activities. 
Second, he could have acted to avoid criminal prosecution and 
reported the conduct to the police. Third, Appellant could have 
found a new place to live or moved in with a friend until the end 
of his lease. Each of these alternatives was readily available to 
Appellant, and each would have allowed Appellant to avoid the 
Appellant's actions appear to be a clear violaton of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (attached hereto as Addendum 3). 
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perceived risk of testing positive for marijuana from passive 
inhalation* 7 
The Court therefore must find that the Board's decision 
concerning "control" is supported by the evidence because 
Appellant clearly had the power and capacity to prevent testing 
positive for marijuana. 
3. Appellant Clearly Acted with Knowledge. 
The Industrial Commission's administrative rule for 
determining "just cause" contains the following explanation of 
"knowledge." 
Knowledge. The employee must have had a 
knowledge of the conduct which the employer 
expected. It is not necessary that the claimant 
intended to cause harm to the employer, but he 
should reasonably have been able to anticipate 
the effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may 
not be established unless the employer gave a 
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had 
a pertinent written policy, except in the case of 
a flagrant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations are 
unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence 
of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning is 
one way of showing that the employee had 
knowledge of the expected conduct. After the 
employee is given a warning, he should be given 
an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct. 
Additional violations occurring after the warning 
would be necessary to establish just cause for a 
discharge. 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) para. Bl (1986). 
7Further, Appellant submitted no evidence as to any differ-
ences regarding the actual or potential harmful effect of marijuana 
residue in the body's system stemming from passive as opposed to 
direct inhalation. 
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At page 9 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant "concedes that 
he knew that the presence of marijuana in his system would likely 
result in termination. . . . " Appellant's concession recognizes 
Respondent's establishment of a written drug testing policy in 
1985, and reflects his awareness of that program prior to the 
first time he tested positive for marijuana.8 The depth of his 
awareness was reinforced by his conduct after the second test. At 
the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, Respondent's 
Employee Relations Area Representative testified that after the 
second test had been performed, but before the results were made 
available, Appellant telephoned to express his concerns over a 
second positive test and an "explanation" as to why he might test 
positive. Appellant stated his roommates smoked marijuana and he 
was afraid of passive inhalation. (Administrative Law Judge 
hearing February 11, 1988, Record at p. 16.) 
The admissions of Appellant and the other evidence before 
the Board established that Respondent had a written drug testing 
policy, that Appellant knew testing positive for marijuana could 
result in termination, and that, in addition, Appellant believed 
passive inhalation could cause a positive test result possibly 
8Appellant certified under penalty of law on the ClaimHnr 
Statement of Reason for Discharge (Record at p. 2) that he was 
aware of the drug and alcohol testing policy, that he received a 
written warning on October 7, 1987, for a previous violation of 
the policy, and that he was informed that a second violation would 
result in his discharge. 
-15-
resulting in termination. Based on these facts, this Court must 
find that the Board's decision with regard to the Appellant's 
"knowledge"' is supported by the record. 
B. THE BOARD'S DECISION IN THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH 
PRIOR DECISIONS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS. 
Appellant claims that the Board's decision in this case 
is inconsistent with this Court's decision in Champ1 in Petroleum, 
supra. The Champ1in Petroleum decision is readily distinguishable 
from this case. There, the claimant was discharged after the 
employer received a medical discharge report indicating that the 
claimant's mental illness and breakdown might have been 
exacerbated from the claimant's intermittent use of and withdrawal 
from marijuana. The employer did not have a policy against drug 
use by employees, and the employer performed no drug testing prior 
to terminating the claimant. Ld. at 332. Further, the claimant 
there was terminated because he was unable to return to work 
without limitation, not because of any mental problems or 
drug-related conduct. Id., at 331. Based on those facts, the 
Administrative Law Judge, whose findings and conclusions were 
adopted in full by the Board, concluded that neither the control 
nor the culpability factors supported a finding of just cause. On 
appeal, this Court affirmed the administrative decision, 
concluding that it was "well within the bounds of reason and 
rationality for the Board to conclude: "(1) that [claimant's] 
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mental illness was not sufficiently within his control; and (2) 
that any exacerbation of his mental problems from his use of 
marijuana did not rise to the level of fault essential to 
establish just cause and deny him his unemployment benefits." Id. 
at 332-33. Champlin Petroleum does not stand for the proposition, 
as asserted by Appellant, that in order to justify the denial of 
unemployment benefits, the conduct must have been committed on the 
job or must have impacted job performance.9 
Not only is the decision in Champlin Petroleum 
distinguishable from the case at hand, but the issues here are 
almost identical to those in Western Dairymen Cooperative, Inc. v. 
Board of Review, 684 P.2d 647 (Utah 1984). In Western Dairymen 
the operator of a cheese factory appealed an order of the Board 
granting unemployment benefits to employees who refused to comply 
with the operator's grooming policy prohibiting employees from 
wearing beards or mustaches. Although the Board in that case did 
not determine whether the grooming policy had a valid business 
purpose, the Court found that the policy was intended to improve 
sanitary conditions, and that it was not an extreme or 
^Requiring an employer to show "actual" impact on job 
performance would be contrary to the clear language of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l) (wh ch only 
requires conduct "adverse to the employer's interest") and the 
Unemployment Insurance Rule 35-4-5(b)(l) 1f Bl (1986) (which 
provides that the discharge must be necessary to avoid actual or 
potential harm). 
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unreasonable measure. In reversing the decision of the Board, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that employers have the right to formulate 
rules furthering the employer's legitimate business interests. 
The most important factor in determining the reasonableness of a 
business purpose focuses on whether it advances the employer's 
interest as opposed to being a condition of employment unrelated 
to actual job needs or performance. 1^ 3. at 649. Application of 
that factor set forth by the Supreme Court in Western Dairymen to 
the facts of this case compels a finding that the Respondent's 
drug testing policy furthers legitimate business interests. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that the actionable 
misconduct is not necessarily limited to conduct occurring during 
the hours of employment and on the employer's premises. 
Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 6 63 P.2d 
440, 443 (Utah 1983). In Clearfield City, the Court reversed the 
decision of the Board and held that a police officer, fired for 
engaging in off-duty sodomy, was not entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits. Off-duty conduct continues to be a 
relevant consideration in determining whether employee misconduct 
affects legitimate business interests of the employer. 
In summary, as discussed above, sustaining the Board's 
decision in this case will be consistent with precedents of the 
Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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C. TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO RECOVER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AFTER 
TESTING POSITIVE FOR MARIJUANA ON TWO SEPARATE OCCASIONS 
WOULD FRUSTRATE LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
The Utah Employment Security Act was enacted to protect 
the public from the economic insecurity created by unemployment 
resulting from conduct over which the employee has no control. It 
was not enacted to allow employees to receive benefits for engaging 
in conduct that is adverse to the interests of the employer, 
co-employees, or the general public. Appellant should not be 
permitted to benefit from conduct that is against Respondent's and 
the general public's interests by receiving unemployment 
benefits.1° 
The State Legislature enacted the Drug and Alcohol 
Testing Act not only to provide guidelines for employers who 
implement testing for drugs and alcohol, but to also protect them 
from any direct actions by employees resulting from drug and 
alcohol testing provided that the employer's program complies with 
the Act. U.C.A. § 34-38-1 et seg. To allow a discharged employee 
to recover unemployment benefits after being terminated for 
1
°Not only will granting unemployment benefits to persons 
discharged as a result of testing positive for drugs impede 
employers and society from correcting drug-related workplace 
problems, it would distort the entire thrust of the State's 
Employment Security Act. For example, it may encourage some 
employees to use their consumption of alcohol and drugs to 
manipulate the system so as to allow them to be "fired" from their 
employment and to then receive unemployment benefits while they 
pursue other activities. This Court should not sanction such 
conduct and should not reward those who test positive for drugs. 
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testing positive for drugs would allow the employee to do 
indirectly what he or she cannot do directly, i.e., recover money 
after being discharged for testing positive for drugs. Such a 
result would frustrate the legislative intent of the Utah Drug and 
Alcohol Testing Act, and would disregard public policy concerns 
that led to the creation and implementation of drug testing 
policies and legislation. In effect, the employee would receive 
unemployment compensation for criminal acts. 
D. APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RAISE NEW ISSUES ON 
APPEAL. 
Appellant and the ACLU have raised two constitutional 
issues that were not raised below: equal protection and substantive 
due process. Utah courts have consistently and strongly opposed 
the raising of issues for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., 
Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986); Trimble Real Estate 
v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App. 1988). 
The general rule followed by Utah courts is well recognized by 
courts of other jurisdictions, and is based on the ground that 
courts of appeal do not have the power to review decisions of lower 
courts for errors that were not raised below. 5 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Appeal and Error, § 545. This general rule applies equally when 
constitutional issues are first raised on appeal, except where a 
person's liberty may be at stake. See, e.g., Pratt v. City Council 
of the City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981). 
Although Utah courts have not addressed the applicability of this 
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rule in reviewing an administrative agency's decision, courts of 
other states have applied this rule. See, e.g M Lewis v. Anaconda 
Company, 543 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Mt. 1975) (claimant could not raise 
constitutional issue of due process for the first time on appeal, 
and court did not therefore consider it.); Smith v. Workmen's 
Compensation Appeal Board, 396 A.2d 905, 906 n.l (Pa. 1979). Based 
on the general rule, Respondent submits that the Appellant and the 
ACLU may not raise new issues concerning equal protection and 
substantive due process. 
E. THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE CAN BE RESOLVED WITHOUT ADDRESSING 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS FIRST RAISED BY APPELLANT AND 
THE ACLU ON APPEAL. 
"It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid 
addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so." State 
v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). If this Court can 
decide the issues without addressing the constitutional claims 
raised for the first time on appeal by Appellant and the ACLU, the 
Court should do so. See, e.g., Goodsel v. Department of Business 
Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 1974); Clinton City v. 
Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967). This case involves only the 
issue of whether the Appellant was discharged for just cause as 
that term is defined by U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(1). Resolution of this 
issue does not require any constitutional analysis. Accordingly, 
even if this Court were to conclude that the constitutional issues 
can be raised for the first time on appeal, this Court should 
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avoid addressing them because the resolution of the constitutional 
claims is unnecessary to decide the issue of whether Appellant was 
justly discharged.ll 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review decision denying unemployment 
benefits to Appellant after he was discharged for testing positive 
1
*Even if this Court decides that the constitutional issues 
can be raised for the first time on appeal, it is clear that the 
ACLU's and the Appellant's arguments in this regard are without 
merit. First, the ACLU erroneously claims that if this Court 
upholds the denial of unemployment benefits based on positive drug 
tests, such a determination would be unconstitutional because 
there was no showing that Appellant's job performance was 
impaired. That contention incorrectly analyzes the language of 
the statute, implementing rules and prior cases. As set forth in 
detail above, the sole issue in this case is whether the claimant 
was discharged for "just cause" as defined by the Utah Employment 
Security Act; U.C.A. § 35-4-5(b)(l) and Unemployment Insurance 
Rule 35-4-5(b)(1), 1[ Bl (1986), and resolution of this issue 
requires no constitutional analysis. Second, the Appellant 
incorrectly asserts that the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act is 
unconstitutional because it creates different classes of employers 
and employees. The Act allows, but does not require, private 
employers to implement drug and alcohol testing procedures 
pursuant to certain guidelines. It does not prevent public 
employers from implementing drug and alcohol testing policies. As 
a result, even if such a constitutional argument were relevant to 
the questions in this case, the Act does not create different 
classes of employers and employees. See, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company v. Salt Lake City Corporation", 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). 
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for marijuana on two separate occasions is supported by 
substantial evidence, and should be affirmed by this Court 
Dated this Zi sf day of April, 1989. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
/ / 
Janet Hugie Smitiy 
Larry G. Moore 
Paul D. Newman 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Morton Thiokol, Inc. 
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VIII. ADDENDA 
Addendum 1 Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, 
U.C.A. § 34-38-1, et seq. 
Addendum 2 Department of Defense Interim Rule, 
53 Fed. Reg. 37,763 
Addendum 3 Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8 
(A.l) 
ADDENDUM 1 
Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, 
U.C.A. § 34-38-1, et seq. 
CHAPTER 38 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 
Section Section 
34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose 
and intent of chapter. 
34-38-2. Definitions. 34-38-10. 
34-38-3. Testing for drugs or alcohol. 
34-38-4. Samples — Identification and col-
lection. 
34-38-5. Time of testing — Cost of testing 
and transportation. 34-38-11. 
34-38-6. Requirements for collection and 
testing. 
34-38-7. Employer's written testing policy 34-38-12. 
— Purposes and requirements 
for collection and testing — 
Employer's use of test results. 34-38-13. 
34-38-8. Employer's disciplinary or reha- 34-38-14. 
bilitative actions. 34-38-15. 
34-38-9. No cause of action arises for fail-
ure to test or detect substance 
or problem, or for termination 
of testing program. 
No cause of action arises against 
employer unless false test re-
sult — Presumption and limita-
tion of damages in claim 
against employer. 
Bases for cause of action for defa-
mation, libel, slander, or dam-
age to reputation. 
No cause of action arises based on 
failure of employer to establish 
testing program. 
Confidentiality of information. 
Employee not "handicapped." 
No physician-patient relationship 
created. 
34-38-1. Legislative findings 
chapter. 
Purpose and intent of 
The Legislature finds that a healthy and productive work force, safe work-
ing conditions free from the effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of 
the quality of products produced and services rendered in this state, are im-
portant to employers, employees, and the general public. The Legislature 
further finds that the abuse of drugs and alcohol creates a variety of work-
place problems, including increased injuries on the job, increased absentee-
ism, increased financial burden on health and benefit programs, increased 
workplace theft, decreased employee morale, decreased productivity, and a 
decline in the quality of products and services. 
Therefore, in balancing the interests of employers, employees, and the wel-
fare of the general public, the Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing 
for drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this chapter, is in 
the best interest of all parties. 
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34-38-2 LABOR IN GENERAL 
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any employee from seeking 
damages or job reinstatement, if action was taken by his employer based on a 
false drug or alcohol test result. 
History. C. 1953, 34-38-1, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 1. 
34-38-2. Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Alcohol" means ethyl alcohol or ethanol. 
(2) "Drugs" means any substance recognized as a drug in the United 
States Pharmacopeia, the National Formulary, the Homeopathic 
Pharmacopeia, or other drug compendia, or supplement to any of those 
compendia. 
(3) "Employer" means any person, firm, or corporation, including any 
public utility or transit district, which has one or more workers or opera-
tors employed in the same business, or in or about the same establish-
ment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written. 
"Employer" does not include the federal or state government, or other 
local political subdivisions. 
(4) "Employee" means any person in the service of an employer, as 
defined by Subsection (3), for compensation. 
(5) "Prospective employee" means any person who has made applica-
tion to an employer, whether written or oral, to become his employee. 
(6) "Sample" means urine, blood, breath, saliva, or hair. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-2, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 2. 
34-38-3. Testing for drugs or alcohol. 
It is not unlawful for an employer to test employees or prospective em-
ployees for the presence of drugs or alcohol, in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter, as a condition of hiring or continued employment. However, 
employers and management in general must submit to the testing themselves 
on a periodic basis. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-3, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 3. 
34-38-4. Samples — Identification and collection. 
In order to test reliably for the presence of drugs or alcohol, an employer 
may require samples from his employees and prospective employees, and may 
require presentation of reliable identification to the person collecting the sam-
ples. Collection of the sample shall be in conformance with the requirements 
of Section 34-38-6. The employer may designate the type of sample to be used 
for testing. 
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DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 34-38-6 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-4, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 4. 
34-38-5. Time of testing — Cost of testing and transporta-
tion. 
(1) Any drug or alcohol testing by an employer shall occur during or imme-
diately after the regular work period of current employees and shall be 
deemed work time for purposes of compensation and benefits for current em-
ployees. 
(2) An employer shall pay all costs of testing for drugs or alcohol required 
by the employer, including the cost of transportation if the testing of a current 
employee is conducted at a place other than the workplace. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-5, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 5. 
34-38-6. Requirements for collection and testing. 
All sample collection and testing for drugs and alcohol under this chapter 
shall be performed in accordance with the following conditions: 
(1) The collection of samples shall be performed under reasonable and 
sanitary conditions; 
(2) Samples shall be collected and tested with due regard to the privacy 
of the individual being tested, and in a manner reasonably calculated to 
prevent substitutions or interference with the collection or testing of reli-
able samples; 
(3) Sample collection shall be documented, and the documentation pro-
cedures shall include: 
(a) labeling of samples so as reasonably to preclude the probability 
of erroneous identification of test results; and 
(b) an opportunity for the employee or prospective employee to 
provide notification of any information which he considers relevant 
to the test, including identification of currently or recently used pre-
scription or nonprescription drugs, or other relevant medical infor-
mation. 
(4) Sample collection, storage, and transportation to the place of test-
ing shall be performed so as reasonably to preclude the probability of 
sample contamination or adulteration; and 
(5) Sample testing shall conform to scientifically accepted analytical 
methods and procedures. Testing shall include verification or confirma-
tion of any positive test result by gas chromatography, gas chromatogra-
phy-mass spectroscopy, or other comparably reliable analytical method, 
before the result of any test may be used as a basis for any action by an 
employer under Section 34-38-8. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-6, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, S 6. 
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34-38-7 LABOR IN GENERAL 
34-38-7. Employer's written testing policy — Purposes and 
requirements for collection and testing — Em-
ployer's use of test results. 
(1) Testing or retesting for the presence of drugs or alcohol by an employer 
shall be carried out within the terms of a written policy which has been 
distributed to employees and is available for review by prospective employees. 
(2) Within the terms of his written policy, an employer may require the 
collection and testing of samples for the following purposes: 
(a) investigation of possible individual employee impairment; 
(b) investigation of accidents in the workplace or incidents of work-
place theft; 
(c) maintenance of safety for employees or the general public; or 
(d) maintenance of productivity, quality of products or services, or se-
curity of property or information. 
(3) The collection and testing of samples shall be conducted in accordance 
with Sections 34-38-4,34-38-5, and 34-38-6, and need not be limited to circum-
stances where there are indications of individual, job-related impairment of 
an employee or prospective employee. 
(4) The employer's use and disposition of all drug or alcohol test results are 
subject to the limitations of Sections 34-38-8 and 34-38-13. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-7, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, * 7. 
34-38-8. Employer's disciplinary or rehabilitative actions. 
Upon receipt of a verified or confirmed positive drug or alcohol test result 
which indicates a violation of the employer's written policy, or upon the re-
fusal of an employee or prospective employee to provide a sample, an employer 
may use that test result or refusal as the basis for disciplinary or rehabilita-
tive actions, which may include the following: 
(1) a requirement that the employee enroll in an employer-approved 
rehabilitation, treatment, or counseling program, which may include ad-
ditional drug or alcohol testing, as a condition of continued employment; 
(2) suspension of the employee with or without pay for a period of time; 
(3) termination of employment; 
(4) refusal to hire a prospective employee; or 
(5) other disciplinary measures in conformance with the employer's 
usual procedures, including any collective bargaining agreement. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-8, enacted by L. Cross-References. — State alcoholism and 
1987, ch. 234, § 8. drug rehabilitative services, § 63-43-3. 
34-38-9. No cause of action arises for failure to test or de-
tect substance or problem, or for termination of 
testing program. 
No cause of action arises in favor of any person against an employer who 
has established a policy and initiated a testing program in accordance with 
this chapter, for any of the following: 
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DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 34-38-11 
(1) failure to test for drugs or alcohol, or failure to test for a specific 
drug or other substance; 
(2) failure to test for, or if tested for, failure to detect, any specific drug 
or other substance, disease, infectious agent, virus, or other physical ab-
normality, problem, or defect of any kind; or 
(3) termination or suspension of any drug or alcohol testing program or 
policy. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-9, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 9. 
34-38-10. No cause of action arises against employer un-
less false test result — Presumption and limita-
tion of damages in claim against employer. 
(1) No cause of action arises in favor of any person against an employer who 
has established a program of drug or alcohol testing in accordance with this 
chapter, and who has taken any action under Section 34-38-8, unless the 
employer's action was based on a false test result. 
(2) In any claim, including a claim under Section 34-38-11, where it is 
alleged that an employer's action was based on a false test result: 
(a) there is a rebuttable presumption that the test result was valid if 
the employer complied with the provisions of Section 34-38-6; and 
(b) the employer is not liable for monetary damages if his reliance on a 
false test result was reasonable and in good faith. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-10, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 10. 
34-38-11. Bases for cause of action for defamation, libel, 
slander, or damage to reputation. 
No cause of action for defamation of character, libel, slander, or damage to 
reputation arises in favor of any person against an employer who has estab-
lished a program of drug or alcohol testing in accordance with this chapter, 
unless: 
(1) the results of that test were disclosed to any person other than the 
employer, an authorized employee or agent of the employer, the tested 
employee, or the tested prospective employee; 
(2) the information disclosed was based on a false test result; 
(3) the false test result was disclosed with malice; and 
(4) all elements of an action for defamation of character, libel, slander, 
or damage to reputation as established by statute or common law, are 
satisfied. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-12, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 12. 
109 
34-38-12 LABOR IN GENERAL 
34-38-12. No cause of action arises based on failure of em-
ployer to establish testing program. 
No cause of action arises in favor of any person based upon the failure of an 
employer to establish a program or policy of drug or alcohol testing. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-12, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 12. 
34-38-13. Confidentiality of information. 
(1) All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or test 
results received by the employer through his drug or alcohol testing program 
are confidential communications and may not be used or received in evidence, 
obtained in discovery, or disclosed in any public or private proceeding, except 
in a proceeding related to an action taken by an employer under Section 
34-38-8 or an action under Section 34-38-11. 
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) shall be the property of the 
employer. 
(3) An employer is entitled to use a drug or alcohol test result as a basis for 
action under Section 34-38-8. 
(4) An employer may not be examined as a witness with regard to the 
information described in Subsection (1), except in a proceeding related to an 
action taken by the employer under Section 34-38-8 or an action under Section 
34-38-11. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-13, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 234, § 13. 
34-38-14. Employee not "handicapped." 
An employee or prospective employee whose drug or alcohol test results are 
verified or confirmed as positive in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter shall not, by virtue of those results alone, be defined as a person with 
a "handicap" for purposes of Chapter 35, Title 34, the Utah Anti-Discrimina-
tory Act. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-14, enacted by 1. 
1987, ch. 234, § 14. 
34-38-15. No physician-patient relationship created. 
A physician-patient relationship is not created between an employee or 
prospective employee, and the employer or any person performing the test, 
solely by the establishment of a drug or alcohol testing program in the work-
place. 
History: C. 1953, 34-38-15, enacted by L. chapter or the application of any provision to 
1987, ch. 234, § 15. any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1987, ch. remainder of the chapter is given effect with-
244, § 16 provided that if any provision of that out the invalid provision or application. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Department of Defense Interim Rule, 
53 Fed. Reg. 37,763 
12-27-88 (DLR) TEXT (No* 248) E - l 
INTERIM DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS GOVERNING 
DftUG FREE WORKPLACE PROGRAMS FOR CONTRACTORS 
PART 223-ENVIRONMENT, 
CONSERVATION AND 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
2. A new Subpart 223,75, consisting of 
sections 2237500 through 23.?504, i« 
added to read as follows; 
Subpart 223.75—Drug-free Work Pgrc© 
Sue, 
2237500 Scope at subpart. 
S2SJS01 Policy. 
223.7502 Definitions, 
223.7503 General 
229.7504 Contract ele\taa, 
Subpart 223.75—Drug-Free Wortc 
Force 
223.7500 Scope of subpart 
This subpart proscribed policies and 
procedures concerning drug abuse *a it 
impacts on the performance of defame 
contracts. Department a may establish 
eparial procedures as they determine 
necessary to satisfy their mission 
requirements, 
23.7501 Policy, 
It is the policy of the Department of 
Defense that defense contractors shall 
maintain a program for achieving a 
drug-free work force. 
223.7502 Definition!* 
"Illegal drugs/* as used in this 
subpart,means oo$trolle$ substances 
included in Schedule 1 and Git as defined 
by section 802(6) of Title 21 of the 
United States Code, the possession of 
which is unlawful under Chapter IS of 
that Title. The term "illegal druca" does 
not mean the use of a controlled 
substance pursuant to a valid 
prescription or other uses authorized by 
law. 
"Employee in a sensitive position," ea 
used In thiu subpart, mesne an employee 
who baa been granted access to 
classified information; or employees in 
other positions that the contractor 
determines involve National Security, 
health or safety, or functions other than 
the foregoing requiring e high'degree of 
trust and confidence. 
223.7503 General. 
(a) The use of illegal drugs, on or off 
duty, is inconsistent with law-abiding 
behavior expected of all citizen*. 
Employees who use illegal drugs, on or 
off duty, tend to be less productive, less 
reliable, end prone to greater 
absenteeism resulting in the potential 
for Increased cost, delay, and risk to the 
government contract. 
(b) The use of illegal drugs, on or oS 
•duty, by employees can impair the 
ability of those employees to perform 
tasks that are critical to proper contract 
performance and can also result in the 
potential for accident's on duty end for 
failures that can pose a serious throat to 
national security, health, and safety. 
(o) The use of illegal drugs, on or off 
duty, by employees in certain positions 
can result In less than the complete 
reliability, stability, and good judgment 
that are consistent with access to 
sensitive information. Use of Illegal 
drugs also creates the possibility of 
coercion, influence, and irresponsible 
action underpressure that mey pose a 
serious risk to national security, and 
health and aafety, 
223,7504 Contract dause. 
The contracting officer shall Insert the 
clause at 252.223-7500 in all soliriutiona 
and contracts that meet the following 
criteria; 
(a) All contracts involving access to 
classified information; 
(b) Any other contract when the 
contracting officer determines that 
inclusion of the clause Is necesiary for 
reasons of national security or for the 
purpose of protecting the health or 
§afoty of those using or affected b.v the 
product of or the performance of the 
contract (except for commercial or 
commercial-type products (ace FAR 
11.001)), 
(c) This clause does not apply, to a 
contract or to that part of a contract, 
that ia to be performed outside of the 
United States, its territories, and 
possessions, except as otherwise 
determined by the contacting office* 
PART 252—SOUCITATIOM 
PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT 
CLAUSES, 
9. Section 252.229-7500 is added to 
read as follows; 
232£2S~r50Q Drug-froa work force. 
As proscribed in 223.7504, insert the 
following dause: 
Drug-fte* Work Force {Sep 3952) 
(a) Definitions. "Illegal drugs** as used in 
this clause, means controlled substances 
Included in Schedule I and S, «• defined by 
section $02(6) of Tide 21 of the United States 
Code, the possession of which is unlawful 
under Chapter 19 Of that Tills. The term 
"illegal drugs* does not moan the use of a 
controlled substance pursuant to a valid 
prescription or other uses authorized by lew. 
'•Employee in a sensitive position." as used 
in this dause, means en employee who hae 
been granted access to obtained information; 
or employeos in other positions that the 
contractor determines involve notional 
security, health or safety, or function* othor 
then the foregoing requiring a high degree of 
trust end confidence. 
(b) The Contractor agrees to institute and 
maintain a prosrram for achieving the 
ebJseuVe or a drag-free work force, While 
this clause defines criteria for such a 
prOfr&nli Contractors are encouraged to 
implement alternative ipproacheS 
comparable to the criteria in paragraph (c) 
below that are designed to achieve the 
Objectives of this eCuse. 
(c) Contractor programs shah* Include the 
following, or appropriate alternative* 
(1) Employee assistance programs 
emphasising Ugh level direction, education, 
counseling, rehabilitation, and coordination 
with available community resources; 
(Z} Supervisory training, to csefat in 
identifying and addressing Illegal drug UBe by 
Contractor employees; 
(3) Provision For seir-rcfenats as wutl QD 
supervisory referral* to treatment with 
maximum respect for individual 
confidentiality consistent with safety and 
security issues; 
(4) Provision for identifying illegal drug 
users, including testing on a controlled and 
carefully monitored basis. Employee drug 
testing progreme ahell be established taking 
account of the following 
(i) The Contractor shall establish e program 
that provides for testing for the use of Utcgal 
drugi by employees In eoniitive positions. 
The extent of and criteria for such testing 
shall be determined by the Contractor baaed 
on considerations that include the nature of 
the work bains performed under the contract, 
the employee's duties, the efficient use of 
Contractor resources, and the risks to public 
health, safety, national security that could 
roiult from the failure of an employee 
adequately to discharge his or her position 
(iti Ip addition, the Contractor mey 
estaoUffh a program for employee drug 
testing— 
(A) When there ia a reasonable suspicion 
that an employee uses illegal drugs; or 
(B) When a employes has been invoked in 
•njiB (dent orunsafe practice; 
(C) As part bTor as eTollcw-up to 
counseling or rehabilitation for ibegal drug 
use; 
(D) As part of a voluntary employee drug 
testing program, 
(lit) The Contractor mey eetabldh « 
program to test applicants for employment for 
illegal drug use. 
(fv) For the purpose of administering this 
douse, testing for Ulegol druas may be limited 
to those substances for which testing is 
prescribed by section M of Subpart B of the 
''Mandatory Guidelines for Federal 
Workplace Drug Teeting Programs,'* (S3 PR 
11980 (April tl, 19881), issued by the 
Department of Health and Human Service* 
(d) Contractors shall adopt appropriate 
*ubUshod by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., Washington, D.c. 200$? 
B - 2 (No. 248) 
personnel procedure to deal With employes 
who art found 10 bt usinj drug* moaally. 
Contractor! shall not aUcw any employee to 
remain on duty or perform Ic a leneltlva 
position who is found to use MC&BI dregs 
until tuch Ume • • tha oonirador. In 
accordance with procedures established by 
TEXT 
tho contractor, rfatarmines that tha tmployoa 
may perform In such a position. 
(e) The provisions o! tbti ckwe pertaining 
Hi drug totbg programs shall not apply to 
the extent they are Inconsistent with state pr 
local law, or with an existing collective 
~ End of Text-
-End of Section B -
(DLR.) 1 2 - 2 7 - 8 8 
betgainint agreement; provided that with 
respect to the latter, the Contractor agrees 
that those isevci that are In wmfliot will be a 
s\»bje©t of negotiation at the next collective 
bargaining session, 
(End of clause) 
PUOisn^J by THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS. INC. Waahklflton, O.C 20037 
ADDENDUM 3 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
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listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescrip-
tion; 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marihuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
[2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by per-
sons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Subsection 
78-3a-2(3), and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
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(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marihuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marihuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marihuana, if the amount is more than one ounce but less 
than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con-
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marihuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through 
(2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized 
by this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be pun-
ished by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are 
independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chap-
ter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
or intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
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(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, or to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepre-
sentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter, or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is 
upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsec-
tion (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other struc-
ture or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an 
activity sponsored by or through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(i); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or 
(iv) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsec-
tion would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, nor is the person eligible for parole until 
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the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc-
curred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the maxi-
mum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, 
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction autho-
rized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been con-
victed of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-35-20, may, if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to lk the maximum sentence imposed by 
law for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was con-
victed. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the time 
of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no event 
later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or the 
defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or a 
later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the allega-
tion of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or his 
counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the conse-
quences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation of 
the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
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(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under Sub-
section (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or de-
nies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present evi-
dence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is erroneous 
or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was par-
doned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following the 
evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether the defendant 
has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for a showing 
of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court the defen-
dant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the appro-
priate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion deter-
mines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, § 1; 1986, ch. 196, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
$ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; L. 1988, ch. 95, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 92 deleted "as provided in 
Section 58-1-44" following "the consent" in the 
first sentence in Subsection (2)(a)(v) and made 
minor stylistic changes. 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 190 re-
wrote this section, which formerly read as it 
appears in the bound volume. 
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, substituted "convicted of violating" for 
"who violates" throughout the section; deleted 
"upon conviction" preceding "guilty" in Subsec-
tions (l)(b)(i) to UXbXiii), (2)(b)(ii), and (2)(d); 
in Subsection (2)(b) inserted Subsection 
(2)(b)(i); divided former Subsection (2)(b)(i) into 
present Subsections (2)(b)(ii) and (2)(b)(iii) and 
(2)(c) and designated former Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii) as Subsection (2)(d); designated for-
mer Subsection (2)(c) as Subsection (2)(e); in 
present Subsection (2)(b)(ii) inserted "if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 
100 pounds,"; in Subsection (3)(b) deleted 
"upon conviction" preceding "be punished" in 
the first sentence; in Subsection (4Kb) deleted 
"upon conviction" preceding "is guilty"; and 
made various stylistic changes throughout the 
section. 
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Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo- Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Arranging sale. 
Charging offense under Controlled Substances 
—Jury instructions. 
Distribution. 
—Arranging to distribute. 
—Distribution for value. 
Entrapment. 
Jury instruction. 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
—Constructive possession. 
—Production of marijuana. 
Cited. 
Arranging sale. 
This section unmistakably prohibits arrang-
ing to distribute a controlled substance. State 
v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43 (Utah 1987). 
Charging offense under Controlled Sub-
stances Act or Criminal Code. 
—Jury instructions. 
Wherever culpable conduct arises under the 
Controlled Substances Act and is specifically 
defined by it, it is incumbent upon trial courts 
to reject instructions to the jury under more 
general provisions outside the act. State v. 
Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Although jury was improperly instructed on 
aiding and abetting rather than on Subsection 
(l)(a)(iv) of this section, because defendant was 
convicted of possession with intent to distrib-
ute a controlled substance and not of aiding 
and abetting, the aiding and abetting instruc-
tion was superfluous and not the basis of the 
jury's verdict, and the instruction error was 
harmless. State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
Distribution. 
In determining whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support a charge of distribution of 
a controlled substance for value, the relevant 
concern is whether the defendant performed 
the actual sale, or merely acted as an agent 
between the buyer and the source. The latter 
action does not fall within the prohibition of 
distribution of a controlled substance for value. 
State v. Wright, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
The evidence was sufficient to support a con-
viction for distribution of a controlled sub-
stance where the defendant, who was ap-
proached with a request to sell marijuana to a 
police officer, agreed, quoted the selling price, 
and then personally delivered the contraband 
Act or Criminal Code. 
and received the money at his apartment; he 
did not purport to merely find, direct, and in-
troduce the officer to another drug dealer. 
State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1987). 
—Arranging to distribute. 
A person cannot be charged with aiding and 
abetting another when he or she handles the 
negotiations and price of a controlled sub-
stance, but must instead be charged with 
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating 
to distribute a controlled substance as specifi-
cally provided in section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv). 
State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Any willing or intentional lending of aid in 
the distribution of drugs, in whatever form the 
aid takes, is proscribed by Subsection (l)(a)(iv), 
and it is not necessary for the defendant to re-
ceive any value in exchange for drugs to be 
convicted. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986). 
—Distribution for value. 
An exchange of cash for a controlled sub-
stance clearly falls within the broad definition 
of "distribution for value"; whether the defen-
dant realizes a profit or not is irrelevant. State 
v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986). 
Entrapment 
Defendant was not entrapped for unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance 
where, although the police officer visited the 
defendant's office on several occasions, the 
visits were with defendant's invitation or con-
sent. State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 
1986). 
The question of entrapment was properly left 
to the jury, where an undercover police officer, 
who had reason to believe that defendant was 
involved in drug trafficking, asked defendant 
to sell him cocaine on four occasions over a 
forty-day period and, on the fourth contact, de-
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fendant agreed to sell him cocaine, made ar-
rangements to pick it up, and sold him a gram. 
State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986). 
Evidence sufficient to show intent to dis-
tribute. 
See State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986). 
Jury instruction. 
The point of law covered under this catchline 
in the bound volume was overruled in State v. 
Scott, 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
In accord with 1986 Replacement Volume. 
See State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132 (Utah 
1987). 
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defen-
dant's conviction for unlawful production of a 
controlled substance, where it was shown that 
marijuana was being cultivated and produced 
on a lot enclosed by a fence, in a greenhouse 
located twenty feet to the rear of defendant's 
dwelling, and only accessible through defen-
dant's property. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1988). 
—Constructive possession. 
Actual physical possession is not a required 
A.L.R. — Federal criminal liability of nar-
cotics conspirator for different substantive 
crime of other conspirator, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 661. 
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of mar-
ijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to vio-
late 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 113. 
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of her-
oin had intent to distribute it, so as to violate 
21 USCS § 841(a)(i), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 413. 
element of the crime of possession of a con-
trolled substance. A finding of constructive 
possession by the defendant will satisfy the 
possession element. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 
127 (Utah 1987). 
To prove that a defendant was in knowing 
and intentional possession of a controlled sub-
stance, the prosecution need only establish 
that the produced contraband was found in a 
place or under circumstances indicating that 
the accused had the ability and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over it. State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). 
—Production of marijuana. 
In a trial for production of a controlled sub-
stance it was held that the state's evidence 
supported the trial court's finding that scien-
tific tests (together with the objective observa-
tions of professional narcotics agents) proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt the substance 
seized from defendant was marijuana. State v. 
Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in State v. Neilsen, 727 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1986), cert, denied, — U.S.—, 107 S. Ct. 
1565, 94 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1987). 
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of co-
caine had intent to distribute it, so as to violate 
21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 80 A.L.R. Fed. 397. 
Sufficiency of evidence that possessor of con-
trolled substance other than cocaine, heroin, or 
marijuana had intent to distribute it, so as to 
violate 21 USCS § 841(a)(1), 80 A.L.R. Fed. 
507. 
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